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ABSTRACT
Suppose you find the same username on different online
services, what is the probability that these usernames
refer to the same physical person? This work addresses
what appears to be a fairly simple question, which has
many implications for anonymity and privacy on the
Internet. One possible way of estimating this probability
would be to look at the public information associated to
the two accounts and try to match them. However, for
most services, these information are chosen by the users
themselves and are often very heterogeneous, possibly
false and difficult to collect. Furthermore, several web-
sites do not disclose any additional public information
about users apart from their usernames (e.g., discus-
sion forums or Blog comments), nonetheless, they might
contain sensitive information about users.
This paper explores the possibility of linking users
profiles only by looking at their usernames. The intuition
is that the probability that two usernames refer to the
same physical person strongly depends on the “entropy”
of the username string itself. Our experiments, based
on crawls of real web services, show that a significant
portion of the users’ profiles can be linked using their
usernames. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time that usernames are considered as a source of
information when profiling users on the Internet.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online profiling is a serious threat to users privacy. In
particular, the ability to trace users by linking multiple
identities from different public profiles may be of great
interest to profilers, advertisers and the like. Indeed, it
might be possible to gather information from different
online services and combine it to sharpen the knowledge
of users identities. This knowledge may then be exploited
to perform efficient social phishing or targeted spam, and
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might be as well used by advertisers or future employers
seeking information. As it has been colloquially put by
a judge of the US Supreme Court in a recent case about
warrantless GPS tracking1: “When it comes to privacy,
the whole may be more revealing than its parts.”
Recent works [4, 3] showed how it is possible to retrieve
users information from different online social networks
(OSN). All of these works mainly exploit flaws in the
OSN’s API design (e.g., Facebook friend search). Other
approaches [17] use the topology of social network friend
graphs to de-anonymize its nodes.
In this paper, we propose a novel methodology that
uses usernames -an easy to collect information- rather
than social graphs to tie user online identities. Our
technique only assumes knowledge of usernames and it
is widely applicable to all web services that publicly
expose usernames. Our purpose is to show that users’
pseudonyms allow simple, yet efficient tracking of online
activities.
Recent scraping services’ activities illustrate well the
threats introduced by the ability to match up user’s
pseudonyms on different social networks [2]. For instance,
PeekYou.com has lately applied for a patent for a way
to match people’s real names to pseudonyms they use
on blogs, OSN services and online forums [14]. The
methodology relies on public information collected for
an user, that might help in matching different online
identities. The algorithm empirically assigns weights to
each of the collected information so as to deem different
identities to be the same. However, the algorithm is ad-
hoc and not robust to false or mismatching information.
In light of these recent developments, it is desirable that
the research community investigates the capabilities and
limits of these profiling techniques. This will, in turn,
allow for the design of appropriate countermeasures to
protect users’ privacy.
In general, profiling unique identities from multiple
public profiles is a challenging task, as information from
public profiles is often incorrect, misleading or altogether
missing [11]. Techniques designed for the purpose of
profiling need to be robust to these occurrences.
Contributions.
The contributions of this paper are manifold. First,
we introduce the problem of linking multiple online iden-
1http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/08/06-0
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tities relying only on usernames. Second, we devise an
analytical model to estimate the uniqueness of a user-
name, which can in turn be used to assign a probability
that a single username, from two different online services,
refers to the same user. Based on language models and
Markov Chain techniques, our model validates an intu-
itive observation: usernames with low “entropy” (or to
be precise Information Surprisal) will have higher prob-
abilities of being picked by multiple persons, whereas
higher entropy usernames will be very unlikely picked
by multiple users and refer in the vast majority of the
cases to unique users.
Third, we extend this model to cases when usernames
are different across many online services. In essence,
given two usernames our technique returns the proba-
bility that these usernames refer to the same user, and
allows then to effectively trace users identities across
multiple web services using their usernames only. While
we acknowledge that our technique cannot trace users
that choose unrelated usernames on purpose, experimen-
tal data shows that users tend to choose closely related
usernames on different services. Finally, by applying our
technique to subsets of usernames we extracted from real
cases scenarios, we validate and discuss our technique in
the wild.
We envision several possible uses of these techniques,
not all of them malicious. In particular, users might
use our tool to test how unique their username is and,
therefore, take appropriate decision in case they wish to
stay anonymous. To this extent we provide an online
tool that can help users choose appropriate usernames by
measuring how unique and traceable their usernames are.
The tool is available at http://planete.inrialpes.fr/
projects/how-unique-are-your-usernames.
Paper organization.
In Section 2, we overview the related work on privacy
and introduce the machine learning tools used in our
analysis. In Section 4, we introduce our measure to
estimate the uniqueness of usernames and in Section 5,
we extend our model to compute the probability that
two usernames refer to the same person and validate it
using the dataset we collected from eBay and Google
(Section 3). Different techniques are introduced and
evaluated. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss potential
impact of our proposed techniques and present some
possible countermeasures.
2. RELATED WORK AND BACK-
GROUND
2.1 Related Work
Tracking OSNs users.
In [11] the authors propose to use what they call the
online social footprint to profile users on the Internet.
This footprint would be the collection of all little pieces
of information that each user leaves on web services and
OSNs. While the idea is promising this appears to be
only a preliminary work and no model, implementation
or validation is given.
Similarly in [4], Bilge et al. discuss how to link the
membership of users to two different online social net-
works. Noticing that there might be discrepancies in
the information provided by a single user in two social
networks, the authors rely on Google search results to
decide the equivalence of selected fields of interest (as
for assigning uniqueness of a user). Typically, the input
of their algorithm is the name and surname of a user,
that is augmented by the education/occupation as pro-
vided in two different social networks. They use such
input to start two separate Google searches, and if both
appear in the first top three hits, these are deemed to
be equivalent. The corresponding users are consequently
identified as a single user on both social networking sites.
Bilge et al.’s work illustrates well how challenging the
process of identifying users from multiple public profiles
is. Despite the usage of customized crawler and parser
for each social network, the heterogeneity of information
as provided by users (if correct) makes the process hard
to deploy, if not unfeasible, at a large scale.
Record linkage.
Record linkage (RL)(or alternatively Entity Resolu-
tion) [9, 5] refers to the task of finding records that
refer to the same entity in two or more databases. This
is a common task when databases of users records are
merged. For example, after two companies merge they
might also want to merge their databases and find du-
plicate entries. Record linkage is needed in this case
if there are no unique identifiers available (e.g., social
security numbers).
In RL terminology two records that have been matched
are said to be linked. For the purpose of linking pro-
files using usernames, we test several RL techniques and
compare their performance to the ones introduced in
this paper. However, differently from the record linkage
problem, in our setup a complete match of two differ-
ent usernames does not necessarily indicate a positive
identification. Furthermore, the application of record
linkage techniques to link public online user profiles is
novel to the best of our knowledge and presents several
challenges of its own.
Tracking browsers across sessions.
Another related problem is the fingerprinting of web
clients. Usually, ad servers set unique cookies on the
browsers to allow for easy tracking of users between
HTTP requests. A simple and straightforward practise
on browsers to limit the risk of re-identification is to
restrict or disable the use of third-party cookies. How-
ever, recent research [8] has shown that different browser
installations might contain enough unique features or
“entropy”to allow for re-identification even in the absence
of long lived unique identifiers like cookies.
De-anonymizing sparse database and graph data.
[17] proposes an identification algorithm targeting
anonymized social network graphs. The main idea of
this work is to de-anonymize online social graph based
on information acquired from a secondary social network
users are known to belong to as well. Similarity identified
in the network topologies of both services allows then to
identify users belonging to the anonymized graph.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Information Surprisal
Self-information or Information Surprisal measures
the amount of information associated to a specific out-
come of a random variable. If X is a random variable
and x one possible outcome, we denote the information
surprisal of x as I(x). Information Surprisal is com-
puted as I(x) = − log2(P (x)) and hence depends only
on the probability of x. The smaller the probability of
x the higher is the associated surprisal. Entropy, on
the other hand, measures the information associated to
a random variable (regardless of any specific outcome),
denoted H(X). Entropy and Surprisal are deeply re-
lated as entropy can be seen as the expected value of
the information surprisal, H(X) = E(I(X)). Both are
usually measured in bits.
Suppose there exists a discrete random variable that
models the distribution of usernames in a population,
call this variable U . The random variable U follows a
probability mass function PU that associates to each
username u a probability P (u). In this context, the
information surprisal of P (u) is the amount of identifying
information associated to a username u. Every bit of
surprisal adds one bit of identifying information and thus
allows to cut the population in which u might lie in half.
If we assume that there are W users in a population,
then a username u identifies uniquely a user in the pop-
ulation if I(P (u)) > log2(W ). In this sense, information
surprisal gives a measure of the “uniqueness” of a user-
name u and it is the measure we are going to use in this
work. The challenge lies in estimating the probability
P (u), which we will address in Section 4.
Our treatment of information surprisal and its associ-
ation to privacy is similar to the one recently suggested
in [8] in the context of fingerprinting browsers.
3. THE DATASET
Our study was conducted on several different lists of
usernames: (a) a list of 3.5 million usernames gathered
from public Google profiles; (b) a list of 6.5 million
usernames gathered from eBay accounts; (c) a list of
16000 thousand username gathered from our research
center LDAP directory; (d) two large username lists
found online used in a previous study from Dell’Amico
et al. [7]: a “finnish” dataset and a list of usernames
collected from Myspace.
The “finnish” dataset comes from a list publicly dis-
closed in October 20072. The dataset contains user-
names, email addresses and passwords of almost 79000
user accounts. This information has been collected from
-most likely by hacking- the servers of several Finnish
web forums. The MySpace dataset comes from a phish-
ing attack, setting a fake MySpace login web page. This
data has been discolsed in October 2006 and it contains
more than 30000 unique usernames.
2http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/
00001293.html
The use we made of these datasets was threefold. First,
we used the combined list of 10 million usernames (from
eBay and Google) to train our Markov Chain model
needed for the probability estimations. Second, we used
the information on Google profiles to gather ground truth
evidence and test our technique to link multiple public
profiles even in case of slightly different usernames (Sec-
tion 5). Third, we used all the datasets to characterize
username uniqueness and depict Surprisal information
distributions as seen in the wild. Our objective here is to
validate our techniques on several datasets, where users
come from widely distributed locations and may have
different habits as for web services usage and usernames’
choices.
Notably, a feature of Google Profiles 3, allowed us to
build a ground truth we used for validation purposes.
In fact, users on Google Profiles can optionally decide
to provide a list of their other accounts on different
OSNs and web services. This provided us with a ground
truth, for a subset of all profiles, of linked accounts and
usernames.
In our experiments we observed that web services differ
significantly in their username policies. However, almost
all services share a common alphabet of letters and
numbers. Analyzing our most complete set of 10 million
distinct usernames it appears clear that 85% of the users
choose alphanumerical only usernames that thus comply
to all username policy. This fact is of interest when
evaluating the applicability of the techniques explained
in this work.
4. ESTIMATINGUSERNAMEUNIQUE-
NESS
As we explained above, we would like to have a mea-
sure of username uniqueness, which can quantify the
amount of identifying information each username carries.
Information Surprisal is a measure, expressed in bits,
that serves this purpose. However, in order to compute
the Information Surprisal associated to usernames, we
need a way to estimate the probability P (u) for each
username u.
A naive way to estimate P (u), given a dataset of
usernames coming from different services, would be to
use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). If we have
N usernames then we can estimate the probability of
each username u as count(u)
N
, if u belongs to our dataset,
and 0 otherwise. Where count(u) is simply the number
of occurrences of u in the sample. In this case we are
assigning maximum probability to the observed samples
and zero to all the others. This approach has several
drawback, but the most severe is that it cannot be used to
give any estimation for the usernames not in the sample.
Furthermore, the estimation given is very coarse.
Instead, we would like to have a probability estima-
tion that allows us to give estimate probabilities for
usernames we have never encountered. Markov-Chains
have been successfully used to extrapolate knowledge
of human language from small corpuses of text. In our
case, we apply Markov Chain techniques on usernames
3http://www.google.com/profiles
to estimate their probability.
4.1 Estimating username probabilities
with
Markov Chains
Markov models are successfully used in many machine
learning techniques that need to predict human gener-
ated sequences of words, as in speech recognition [15]. In
a very common machine learning problem, one is faced
with the challenge of predicting the next word in a sen-
tence. If for example the sentence is “The quick brown
fox”, the word jumps would be a more likely candidate
than car. This problem is usually referred to as Shannon
Game following Shannon’s seminal work on the topic[18].
This task is usually tackled using Markov-Chains and
modeling the probability of the word jumps depending
of a number of words preceding it.
In our scenario, the same technique can be used to
estimate the probability of username strings instead of
sentences. For example, if one is given the beginning of
a username like sara, it is possible to predict that the
next character in the username will likely be h. Notably
Markov-Chain techniques have been successfully used to
build password crackers [16] and analyse the strength of
passwords [7].
Without loss of generality, the probability of a given
string c1, ..., cn can be written as Π
n
i=1P (ci|c1, ..., ci−1).
In order to make calculation possible a Markovian as-
sumption is introduced: to compute the probability of
the next character, only the previous k characters are
considered. This assumption is important because it sim-
plifies the problem of learning the model from a dataset.
The probability of any given username can be expressed
as:
P (c1, ..., cn) = Π
n
i=1P (ci|ci−k+1, ..., ci−1)
To utilize Markov-Chain for our task we need to es-
timate, in a learning phase, the model parameters (the
conditional probabilities) using a suitable dataset. In our
experiments we used the database of approximately 10
million usernames populated by collecting Google public
profiles and eBay user accounts (see Section 3).
In general, the conditional probabilities are computed
as:
P (ci|ci−k+1, ..., ci−1) = count(ci−k+1, ..., ci−1, ci)
count(ci−k+1, ..., ci−1)
by counting the number of n-grams that contain charac-
ter ci and dividing it by the total number of n− 1-grams
without the character ci. Where an n-gram is simply a
sequence of n characters.
Markov-Chain techniques benefit from the use of
longer n-grams, because longer “histories” can be cap-
tured. However longer n-grams result into an exponential
decrease of the number of samples for each n-gram. In
our experiments we used 5-grams for the computation
of conditional probabilities.
Once we have calculated P (u), we can trivially com-
pute the information surprisal of u as − log2(P (u)).
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Figure 1: Surprisal distribution for eBay and
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vices
In Appendix 8 we give a different, yet related, proba-
bilistic explanation of username uniqueness.
4.2 Experiments
We conducted experiments to estimate the surprisal of
the usernames in our dataset and hence how unique and
identifying they are. As explained above, our Markov-
Chain model was trained using the combined 10 million
usernames gathered from eBay and Google. The dataset
was used for both training and testing by using leave-
one-out cross validation. Essentially, when computing
the probability of a username u using our Markov-Chain
tool, we excluded u from the model the occurrence counts.
This way, the probability estimation for u depended on
all the other usernames but u.
We computed information surprisal for all the user-
names in our dataset and the results are shown in Figure
1. The entropy of both distributions is higher than 35
bits which would suggest that, on average, usernames
are extremely unique identifiers.
Notice the overlap in the distributions that might indi-
cate that our surprisal measure is stable across different
services. Notably, the two services have largely different
username creation policies, with eBay accepting user-
names as short as 3 characters from a wider alphabet and
Google giving more restrictions to the users. Also, the
account creation interfaces vary greatly across the two
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function for
the surprisal of all the services
services. In fact, Google offers a feature that suggests
usernames to new users derived from first and last names.
Probably this is the reason why Google usernames have
a higher Information Surprisal (see Figure 3). It must
also be noted that both services have hundreds of mil-
lions of reported users. This raises the entropy of both
distributions: as the number of users increases they are
forced to choose usernames with higher entropies to find
available ones. Overall it appears clear that usernames
constitute highly identifying piece of information, that
can be used to track users across websites.
In Figure 2 we plot information surprisal for three
datasets gathered from different services. This graph is
motivated by our need to understand how much surprisal
varies across services.
The results are similar to the ones obtained for eBay
and Google usernames. The Finnish list is noteworthy,
these usernames come from different Finnish forums and
most likely belong to Finnish users. However, Suomi (the
official language in Finland) shares almost no common
roots with Roman or Anglo-Saxon languages. This can
be seen as a good representative of the stability of our
estimation for different languages.
Furthermore, notice that the dataset coming from
our own research center (INRIA) has a higher surprisal
than all the other datasets. While there are a possible
number of explanations for this, the most likely one
comes from the username creation policies in place that
require usernames to be the concatenation of first and
last name. The high surprisal comes despite the fact that
the center has only around 16000 registered usernames
and lack of availability does not pressure users to choose
more unique usernames.
Comparing the distributions of Information surprisal
of our different datasets is enlightening, as illustrated
in Figure 3. This confirms that usernames collected
from the INRIA center exhibit the highest information
surprisal, with almost 75% of usernames with a surprisal
higher than 40 bits. We also observe that both Google
and MySpace CDF curves closely match. In all cases, it is
worth noticing that the maximum (resp. the minimum)
fraction of usernames that do exhibit an information
surprisal less than 30 bits is 25% (resp. less than 5%).
This shows that a vast majority of users from our datasets
can be uniquely identified among a population of 1 billion
users, relying only on their usernames.
5. USERNAME COUPLES LINKAGE
The technique explained above can only estimate the
uniqueness of a single username across multiple web
services. However, there are cases in which users, either
willingly or forced by availability, decide to change their
username.
We would like to know whether users change their
usernames in any predictable and traceable way. In
Figure 4(a) and 4(b) is plotted the distribution of the
Levenshtein (or Edit) Distance for username couples. In
particular, Figure 4(a) depicts the distribution for 104
username couples we can verify to belong to single users
(we call this set L for linked), using our dataset. On
the other hand, Figure 4(b) shows the distribution for a
sample of random username couples that do not belong
to a single user (we call this set NL for non-linked). In
the first case the mean distance is 4.2 and the standard
deviation is 2.2, in the second case the mean Levenshtein
distance is 12 and the standard deviation is 3.1. Clearly,
linked usernames are much closer to each other than non
linked ones. This suggests that, in many occurrences,
users choose usernames that are related to each other.
The difference in the two distributions is remarkable and
so it might be possible to estimate the probability that
two different usernames are used by the same person or,
in record linkage terminology, to link different usernames.
However, as illustrated in Section 4, and differently
from record linkage, an almost perfect username match
does not always indicate that the two usernames belong
to the same person. The probability that two user-
names, let’s say sarah and sarah2, are linked (we call
it Psame(sarah, sarah2)) should depend on:
1. how much ‘information’ there is in the common
part of the usernames (in this case sarah) and,
2. how likely is that a user will change one username
into the other (in this case the addition of a 2 at
the end).
We will show two different novel approaches at solving
this problem. The first approach uses a combination
of Markov Chains and a weighted Levenshtein Distance
using probabilities. The second approach makes use of
the theory and techniques used for information retrieval
in order to compute document similarity, specifically
using TF-IDF.
We compare these two techniques to record linkage
techniques for a base-line comparison. Specifically we
use string-only metrics like the normalized Levenshtein
Distance and Jaro distance to link username couples.
Method 1: Linkage using Markov-Chains and LD.
First of all, we need to compute the probability of a
certain username u1 being changed into u2. We denote
this probability as P (u2|u1). Going back to our original
example, P (sarah2|sarah) is equal to the probability of
adding the character 2 at the end of the string sarah.
This same principle can be extended to deletion and
substitution. In general, if two strings u1 and u2 differ
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Figure 4: Levenshtein distance distribution
for username couples gathered from 3 million
Google profiles
by a sequence of basic operations o1, o2, ..., on, we can
estimate P (u2|u1) = P (u1|u2) = p(o1)p(o2)...p(on).
In order to estimate the probability that username u1
and u2 belong to the same person, we need to consider
that there are two different possibilities on how u1 and
u2 were chosen in the first place. The first possibility
is that they were picked independently by two different
users. The second possibility is that they were picked
by the same user, hence they are not independent.
In the former case we can compute P (u1 ∧ u2) as
P (u1) ∗P (u2) since we can assume independence. In the
latter, P (u1 ∧ u2) equals P (u1) ∗ P (u2|u1) in case the
user is the same. Note that using Markov Chains and
the our estimation of P (u2|u1), we can compute all the
terms involved. Estimating the probability Psame(u1, u2)
is now a matter of estimating and comparing the two
probabilities above.
The formula for Psame(u1, u2) is derived from the
probability P (u1 ∧ u2) using Bayes’ Theorem. In fact,
we can rewrite the probability above as P (u1 ∧ u2|S)
where the random variable S can have values 0 or 1 and
it is 1 if u1 and u2 belong to the same person and 0
otherwise. Hence without loss of generality:
P (S|u1 ∧ u2) = P (u1 ∧ u2|S)P (S)∑
S=0,1(P (u1 ∧ u2|S) ∗ P (S))
which leads to P (S = 1|u1 ∧ u2) equal to
P (u1)P (u2|u1)P (S = 1)
P (u1)P (u2)P (S = 0) + P (u1)P (u2|u1)P (S = 1)
where P (S = 1) is the probability of two usernames be-
longing to the same person, regardless of the usernames.
We can estimate this probability to be 1
W
, where W is
the population size. Conversely P (S = 0) = W−1
W
. And
so we can rewrite Psame(u1, u2) as P (S = 1|u1 ∧ u2)
equal to
P (u1)P (u2|u1)
W ∗ P (u1)P (u2)W−1W + W ∗ P (u1)P (u2|u1) 1W
Please note that when u1 = u2 = u then the formula
above becomes
Psame(u, u) =
1
(W − 1)P (u) + 1 = Puniq(u)
which is exactly the same estimation we devised for the
username uniqueness in Appendix.
Method 2: Linkage using TF-IDF.
In this case we use a well known information retrieval
tool called TF-IDF. However, TF-IDF similarity mea-
sures the distance between two documents (or a search
query and a document), which are set of words.
The term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-
IDF) is a weight used to evaluate how important is a
word to a document that belongs to a corpus [13]. The
weight assigned to a word increases proportionally to the
number of times the word appears in the corpus but the
importance decreases for common words in the corpus.
If we have a collection of documents D in which each
document d ∈ D is a set of terms, then we can compute
the term frequency of term ti ∈ d as: tfi,j = ni,jΣknk,j
where ni,j is the number of times term ti appears in
document dj . The inverse document frequency of a term
ti in a corpus D is idfi =
|D|
ci
where ci is the number
of documents in the corpus that contain the term ti.
The TF-IDF is computed as (tf − idf)i,j = tfi,jidfi.
The TF-IDF is often used to measure the similarity
between two documents, say d and d′, in the following
way: first the TF-IDF is computed over all the term
in d and d′ and the results are stored in two vectors v
and v′; then the similarity between the two vectors is
computed, for example using a cosine similarity measure
sim(d, d′) = v·v
′
‖v‖‖v′‖ .
In our case we need to measure the distance between
usernames composed of a single string. The way we
solved this problem is pragmatical: we consider all pos-
sible substrings, of size q, of a string u to be a document
du. Where du can be seen as the building blocks of the
string u. The similarity between username u1 and u2 is
computed using the similarity measure described above.
This similarity measure is referred to in the literature as
q-gram similarity [19], however it has been proposed for
fuzzy string matching in database applications and its
application to online profiling is novel.
Method 3: String Only Similarity Metrics from
Record Linkage.
The Levenshtein (or edit) distance (LD) measures the
similarity between two strings of different or equal length.
It is defined as the minimum number of basic operations
(deletion, insertion and substitution) needed to edit one
string into another. The Levenshtein distance is a useful
tool but its interpretation is not always clear in practice.
For example, consider the case of the usernames alice
and malice, in comparison to the couple vonneumann
and jvonneumann. Both couples have a LD of 1 but
in the latter case the two usernames are clearly more
related than in the former. To cope with these cases a
normalized Levenshtein distance (NLD) is used instead.
While there are different methods used to normalize the
LD between two strings, in our experimentations we use
the following formula: NLD = 1− LD
max(len(u1),len(u2))
.
Note that a NLD is always a number between 0 and 1
since the LD can be at most equal to the length of the
longest string. Note also that the longer u1 or u2 are
the closer NLD approaches one.
The Jaro distance [12] is yet another measure of simi-
larity between two strings and it is mainly used in the
area of record linkage. The distance is normalized and
goes from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating an exact match. We
will use it as a base-line comparison with our novel ap-
proaches. However, because of lack of space, we will not
explain it in detail.
5.1 Validation
Our goal is to assess how accurately usernames can be
used to link two different accounts. For this purpose we
design and build a classifier to separate the two sets L
and NL, respectively of linked usernames and non-linked
usernames.
For our tests the ground-truth evidence was gathered
from Google Profiles and the size the number of linked
username couples |L| is 10000. In order to fairly estimate
the performance of the classifier in a real world scenario
we also randomly paired 10000 non-linked usernames to
generate the NL set.
The username couples were separated, shuffled and a
list of usernames derived from L and NL was constructed.
The task of the classifier is to re-link the usernames in L
maximizing the username couples correctly linked while
linking as few incorrect couples as possible.
In practise for each username in the list our program
computed the distance to any other username and kept
only the link to the single username with highest similar-
ity. If this value is above a threshold then the candidate
couple is considered linked otherwise non-linked.
5.1.1 Measuring the performance of our binary
classifier
Binary classifiers are primarily evaluated in terms
of Precision and Recall, where precision is defined in
terms of true positives (TP ) and false positives (FP ) as
follows precision = TP
TP+FP
and recall takes into account
the true positives compared to false negatives recall =
TP
TP+FN
. The recall is the proportion of usernames that
where correctly classified as unique (TP ) out of all unique
usernames (TP+FN). In addition to those two measures,
we will also use Accuracy defined, with the addition of
true negatives (TN) as accuracy = TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
.
In our case, we are interested in finding usernames
couples that are actually linked (true positives) while
minimizing the number of couples that are linked by
mistake (false positives). Precision for us is a measure
of exactness or fidelity and higher precision means less
profiles linked by mistake. Recall measures how com-
plete our tool is, which is the ratio of linked profiles that
are found out of all linked ones. Precision and recall
are usually shown together in a precision/recall graph.
The reason is that they are often closely related: a clas-
sifier with high recall usually has sub-optimal precision
while one with high precision has lower recall. An ideal
classifier has both a high precision and recall of 1.
Our classifier looks for potentially matching usernames.
Once a set of potential matches is identified our scoring
algorithms are used to calculate how likely it is that
the two usernames represent the same real identity. By
using our labeled test data, score thresholds can be
selected that yield a desired trade-off between recall and
precision. Figure 5 shows the precision and recall of the
two methods discussed in this paper and known string
metrics (Jaro and NLD) at various threshold levels.
In general the metric based on Markov models out-
performs the other metrics. Our Markov-Chain method
has the advantage of having the highest precision values
especially at recalls up 0.71. Remember that a recall
of 0.71 means that 71% of all matching username cou-
ples have been successfully linked. Depending on the
application, one might favor TF-IDF based approach
(method 2) which has good precision at higher recalls or
the Markov chain approach (method 1) which has the
highest precision up to recall 0.7.
The string metrics (NLD and Jaro) perform surpris-
ingly well in the task of matching different usernames.
This is probably because, as shown in Figure 4, non-
linked usernames tend to have higher mean distances
between themselves than linked usernames. Both of
these string-only-metric tools assign a positive weight for
close strings and normalize it according to the maximum
length of the strings. Hence, one possible explanation
of the performance of NLD and Jaro distances is that
the string length models sufficiently well the surprisal
of a string for the purpose of username linkage. Indeed,
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of the entropy as computed
by our uniqueness metric in comparison to the length of
the strings. The graph clearly shows a central area of
correlation between the two metrics and this is reflected
by a high Pearson correlation between the two samples
of 0.801.
5.1.2 Discussion of Results
Our results show that it is possible, with high precision,
to link accounts solely based on usernames. This is due
to the high average entropy of usernames and the fact
that users tend to choose usernames that are related
to each other. Clearly users could completely change
their username for each service they use and, in this
case, our technique would be rendered useless. However,
our analysis shows that users indeed choose similar and
high entropy usernames. This phenomenon can be seen
as related to the much more studied password reuse
phenomenon [10] that plagues web services. Users tend
to reuse a small subset of passwords on 3.9 services
on average, which can be explained by the difficulty
of remembering multiple passwords. The same might
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hold true for usernames, with the notable exception that
usernames can be freely written and do not have to be
securely stored.
This technique might be used by profilers and adver-
tiser trying to link multiple online identities together
in order to sharpen their knowledge of the users. By
crawling multiple web services and OSNs (a crawl of
100M Facebook profiles has already been made available
on BitTorrent) profilers could obtain lists of accounts
with their associated usernames. These usernames could
be then used to link the accounts using the techniques
underlined in the previous section.
5.1.3 Addressing Possible Limitations
The linked username couples we used as ground truth
have been gathered from Google Profiles. We have shown
how that, in this sample, the users tend to choose related
usernames. However, one might argue that this sample
might not be sufficiently representative of the whole
population. Indeed Google Profiles users might be least
concerned about privacy and show a preference of being
traceable by posting their information on their Profiles.
We were not able to test our tool in linking profiles
to certain types of web services in which users are more
privacy aware, like dating and medical websites (e.g.,
WebMD). This was due to the difficulty of gathering
ground truth evidence for this class of services. However,
even if we assume that users choose completely unre-
lated usernames for different websites, our tool might
still be used. In fact, it might be the case that a user
is registered on multiple dating websites with similar
usernames. Those profiles might be linked together with
our tool and more complete information about the user
might be found. For example, a date of birth on a web-
site might be linked with a city of residence and a first
name on another, leading to real world identification.
We acknowledge that, without evidence, this is only spec-
ulation and a more thorough analysis is left for future
work.
5.1.4 Possible Improvements
Finding linked usernames in a population requires
time that is quadratic in the population size, as all
possible couples must be tested for similarity. This
might be too costly if one has millions of usernames
to match. A solution to this problem is to divide the
matching task in two phases. First, divide usernames
in clusters that are likely be linked. For example, one
could choose usernames that share at least one n-gram,
thus restricting the number of combinations that need to
be tried. Second, test all possible combinations within a
cluster.
Another possible improvement is to use a hybrid ap-
proach in which different similarity metrics are combined
to obtain a single similarity [5]. For instance one could
use different similarity metrics (TF-IDF, Markov, Jaro,
etc.) to compose a feature vector that can be then clas-
sified using machine learning techniques like SVMs [6].
Such hybrid approaches are known to perform better in
the record linkage tasks [5]. However, we did not test
or implement such approaches and their application to
linking online identities is left as future work.
6. RELEVANT USERNAME STATIS-
TICS
This section contains username statistics that com-
plement the experiments we proposed and justify our
technique in more practical scenarios.
How do people choose their username?.
We now aim to exploit our Google profiles dataset
to verify whether people use their real name to com-
pose pseudonyms as usernames. If this the case an
attacker might try to generate likely usernames for a
victim and track the victim on multiple web services
using the techniques explained above to determine user-
name uniqueness and linkage. Our analysis is then based
on first and last names as provided by users in their
profiles. We discard from the original dataset names
provided with strings containing non Latin characters.
These names cannot be mapped to a username according
to the Google policy and so we restrict our study to the
Latin alphabet (a-z ). For simplicity, we also considered
names composed by two words (i.e. both first and last
names are provided). After this filtering, we ended up
with 2.6M couples of names and usernames.
We decomposed the name into two words that we refer
to as w1 and w2. According to Google profiles policy,
w1 (resp. w2) refers to the first name (resp. last name).
We first performed a preliminary matching using Perl’s
regular expressions to check whether usernames contain
a combination of w1, w2 and digits. Results are shown
in Table 1.
Matching Condition # Usernames Percentage (%)
w1 and w2 and d 207K 7.93
w1 and w2 774K 29.63
w1 and d 142K 5.47
w2 and d 132K 5.06
w1 241K 9.24
w2 323K 12.38
Not matching 792K 30.3
Total 2,6M 100
Table 1: Usernames construction analysis match-
ing first/last name of users: the first name (w1)
and/or last name (w2) and digits (d).
The matching conditions are exclusive, following the
order as presented in the table (e.g., a username matching
w1 and w2 is counted in the second row and not in the
w1 and w2 rows separately). One of the most remarkable
results is that 70% of the usernames contain at least one
of the two parts of the real name. In particular, 30%
of the collected usernames are constructed by simply
concatenating the first and last name without adding
any digit. We also observe that more than 18% of the
usernames are constructed adding digits to the provided
first and last names. This is most likely a typical behavior
of users, whose first chosen pseudonym (a variant of first
and last name) is not available and that do add digits
(e.g. birth year) to be able to register into the service.
After this preliminary analysis we want to understand
how w1 and w2 are combined to build the exact username.
In order to do that, we also consider the first character
of each word, namely c1 and c2 respectively. Table 2
shows multiple ways to combine w1, w2, c1, c2 and digits
(d). We provide the percentage of usernames observed
for each combination. The results show that more than
50% of usernames match exactly the patterns we tested.
One can observe that the most common way usernames
are generated from users’ real names is by concatenating
the first and last name, in that specific order (almost
14%), or by adding a dot between both names ( 13%).
Pattern % Pattern % Pattern %
w1w2 13.99 c1.w2 0.44 w2d 0.84
w2w1 1.46 w2c1 0.28 w1w2d 6.04
w1.w2 12.95 w2.c1 0.08 w1.w2d 1.86
w2.w1 2.22 c2w1 0.09 w2w1d 0.89
w1 0.91 w1c2 0.44 w2.w1d 0.49
w2 0.99 w1.c2 0.09 c1w2d 2.58
c1w2 3.45 w1d 2.71 w1c2d 0.8
Table 2: Usernames exactly matching a pattern.
Again, because first-chosen usernames might be al-
ready in use, users typically choose to (or are suggested
to by the online service itself) add a number as a postfix
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distribution
of their desired username. In particular, we observe that
in most of these cases, users add exactly respectively
two or four numbers, in 40% of the cases and 20% re-
spectively. These ending digits suggest then either the
year of birth (full or simply the last two digits) or the
birth date.
Finally, figure 7 shows the distribution of the number
of different usernames the users in our dataset utilize.
The graph shows that most users have two or three
different usernames. The mean number of usernames
per user is 2.3.
7. DISCUSSION
Recently some governments and institutions are trying
to pass laws and policies to force users to tie their digital
identities with their real ones. For example, there is a
current discussion in China and France [1] on laws that
would require users to use their real names when posting
comments on blogs and forums. Similarly, the company
Blizzard had started an effort to tie real identities to the
ones used to post comments on its video games forums.
This work shows that it is clearly possible to tie digital
identities together and, most likely, to real identities in
many cases only using ubiquitous usernames. We also
showed that, even though users are free to change their
usernames at will, they do not do it frequently and, when
they do, it is in a predictable way. Our technique might
then be used as an additional tool when investigating
online crime. It is however also subject to abuse and
could result in breaches in privacy. Advertisers could
automatically build online profiles of users with high
accuracy and minimum effort, without the consent of
the users involved.
Spammers could gather information across the web
to send extremely targeted spam, which we dub E-mail
spam 2.0. For example, by matching a Google profile
and an eBay account one could send spam emails that
mention a recent sale. In fact, while eBay profiles do
not show much personal information (like real names)
they do show recent transactions indexed by username.
This would enable very targeted and efficient phishing
attacks. We argue that these targeted attacks might
have higher click rates for spammers thus leading to
smaller spam campaigns that would be much harder for
spam classifiers to recognize.
Finally, users could use our tool to assess how unique
and linkable their usernames are. They can thus take an
informed decision on whether to change their pseudonym
for their online activity they wish to remain private.
Paradoxically, it would be difficult for an user who de-
cides to prevent the linking of her different usernames
(particularly on OSNs), to choose usernames that are
unlinkable without loosing some of the benefits of the
various features of OSNs.
In the light of our results, an analysis on the nature
and anonymity of usernames is needed. Historically
usernames have been used to identify users in small
groups, one such example are Unix usernames. In groups
of dozens or few hundreds of people, usernames naturally
tend to be not identifying and non unique 4. As the
online communities grow in size, so does the entropy
of the usernames. Nowadays users are forced to choose
usernames that have to be unique in online services that
have hundreds of million of users. Naturally users had to
adapt and choose higher entropy usernames to be able
to find usernames that were not already assigned. This
can allow for privacy breaches.
7.1 Countermeasures
On the user side.
Following this work users might change their user-
name habits and use different usernames on differ-
ent web services. We released our tool as a web
application that users can access to estimate how
unique their username is and thus take informed de-
cision on the need to change their usernames when
they deem appropriate (http://planete.inrialpes.
fr/projects/how-unique-are-your-usernames).
For web services.
There are two main features that make our technique
possible and exploitable in real case scenarios. First,
web services and OSNs allow access to public accounts
of their users via their usernames. This can be used to
easily check for existence of a given username and to
automatically gather information. Some web services like
Twitter are built around this particular feature. Second,
web services usually allow the user pages to be crawled
automatically. While in some cases this might be a
necessary evil to allow search engines to access relevant
content, in many instances there is no legitimate use of
this technique and indeed some OSNs explicitly forbid
it in the terms of service agreements, e.g., Facebook.
While preventing automatic abuse of public content
can be difficult in general, for example when the attacker
has access to a large number of IPs, it is possible to at
least throttle access to those resources via CAPTCHAs
[20] or similar techniques. For example, in our study we
discovered that eBay presents users with a CAPTCHA
if too many requests are directed to their servers from
4 We compared the mean entropy of the usernames on
a shared server in our lab with the ones gathered from
Google and the difference is remarkable.
the same IP.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the problem of linking
online profiles using only usernames. Our technique
has the advantage of being almost always applicable
since most web services do not keep usernames secret.
Two family of techniques were introduced. The first one
estimates the uniqueness of a username to link profiles
that have the same username. We gather from language
model theory and Markov-Chain techniques to estimate
uniqueness. Usernames gathered from multiple services
have been shown to have a high entropy and therefore
might be easily traceable.
We extend this technique to cope with profiles that are
linked but have different usernames and tie our problem
to the well known problem of record linkage. All the
methods we tried have high precision in linking username
couples that belong to the same users.
Ultimately we show a new class of profiling techniques
that can be exploited to link together and abuse the
public information stored on online social networks and
web services in general.
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APPENDIX
Username uniqueness from a probabilistic
point of view
We now focus on computing the probability that only
one users has chosen username u in a population. We
refer to this probability as Puniq(u).
Intuitively Puniq(u) should increase with the decrease
in likelihood of P (u). However, Puniq(u) also depends
on the size of the population in which we are trying to
estimate uniqueness. For example, consider the case of
first names. Even an uncommon first name does not
uniquely identify a person in a very large population, e.g.
the US. However, it is very likely to uniquely identify a
person in a smaller population, like a classroom.
To achieve this goal we use the P (u) to calculate
the expected number of users in the population that
would likely choose username u. Let us denote by n(u)
the expected number of users that choose string u as a
username in a given population W . The value of n(u) is
calculated based on P (u) as:
n(u) = P (u) ∗W
where W is the total number of users in the population.
In our case W is an estimation of the number of users
on the Internet: 1.93 billions 5.
In case we are sure there exists at least one user that
selected the username u (because u is taken on some web
service) then the computation of n(u) changes slightly:
n(u) = P (u) ∗ (W − 1) + P (u|u) = P (u) ∗ (W − 1) + 1
where the addition of 1 comes from the fact that we are
sure that there exists at least one user that choses u and
W − 1 is there to account for the person for which we
are sure of.
Finally we can estimate the uniqueness of a username
u by simply considering the probability that our user is
unique in the reference set determined by n(u), hence:
Puniq(u) =
1
n(u)
5 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
